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THE CONSTITUTION AS A WHOLE: A PARTIAL
POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
Mark A Graber*
The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction ("The Bill of
Rights")' is a professionally rewarding and disturbing masterpiece. The work is professionally rewarding because Professor
Akhil Amar develops a meticulously detailed, historically sophisticated, and largely persuasive account of how the liberties
set out in the Bill of Rights were originally understood and the
original relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.2 This is state of the art legal scholarship
that will no doubt influence the way the next generation of
constitutional lawyers and historians study fundamental constitutional rights. Professor Amar's book is professionally disturbing in part because, having agreed to write an essay for this
symposium, there seems little of substance to contribute other
than five pages of extravagant praise and five pages of nitpicking. The Bill of Rights is also professionally disturbing because
what I believe to be state of the art legal scholarship is yet
another work by a distinguished law professor that evinces
little interest in what scholars in my home discipline, political
science, are saying about American constitutionalism.3 The
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1. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

(1998).
2. Dare I add that The Bill of Rights is a politically rewarding masterpiece
because the United States became a more just society when states were obligated to
honor the individual liberties set out in the Bill of Rights, or does this demonstrate
my lack of constitutional sophistication, namely an inability to demand that Americans adopt some hideous policy merely because it seems the best reading of the language and history of a particular text?
3. Consider the numerous legal commentaries on the present state of constitutional theory that discuss only works on constitutional theory written by law professors. See RICHARD A POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995); Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN &
MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
(1996); MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTI-
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consistent lack of engagement in legal writing with contemporary political science scholarship is particularly surprising given
that constitutionalist concerns are far more central to political
science than to the numerous disciplines that have informed
much contemporary legal commentary. Professor Amar's work
demonstrates and acknowledges the numerous contributions
contemporary historians are making to American constitutional
studies.4 Political scientists who read The Bill of Rights, however, are likely to feel themselves treated more as the citizens
to whom Professor Amar wishes to speak than the fellow scholars with whom he wishes to converse.
Rather than nitpick on the explicit arguments made in The
Bill of Rights, the following pages nitpick on the ways that the
work implicitly excludes political scientists from important
constitutional conversations about the protection of fundamental
liberties. The exclusion is rhetorical rather than deliberate.
Professor Amar bears no personal or intellectual grudge against
political science scholarship that I can detect. My quarrel is
primarily with his tendency to write in ways that implicitly
reduce all normative constitutional questions to questions of
constitutional law. At crucial points, for example, The Bill of
Rights makes claims about the way Americans understand the
Constitution that are supported only by evidence about the way
law professors understand the Constitution. This failing cannot
be remedied merely by adding two political science, three sociol-

TUTIONAL LAW (1988). Tushnet's recent work is far more informed by political science
scholarship. See MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999). Posner, unfortunately, has taken to complaining about the lack of
empirical grounding for much contemporary constitutional theory, never mentioning
numerous constitutional studies by political scientists (and others) that attempt to
integrate constitutional analysis with legal findings. See Richard A. Posner, Against
Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998). For representative books by political scientists integrating empirical findings and constitutional analysis, see KRISTIN
BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988),
MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS (1996), and JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN
DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984). This footnote
would be at least 20 pages if I included articles from the Law and Society Review
and similar journals devoted to the research Posner claims is not being done.
4. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 301-05. Professor Amar does not discuss or cite
the most important study of the Fourteenth Amendment written by a political scientist. See JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1983).
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ogy, and one political psychology work to the relevant string
citation.5 Scholars outside the law school are asking different
constitutional questions than most law professors. The
conflation of American constitutionalism and constitutional law,
for this reason, obscures important issues of constitutional
pedagoguery and practice that a broader interdisciplinary
awareness would bring to light.
The particular focus of this essay is on the two passages in
The Bill of Rights that most clearly equate constitutional scholarship with legal scholarship: Professor Amar's assertion that
Americans rarely study the Constitution as a whole and his
declaration that questions concerning whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights are profoundly important. Had The Bill of Rights explicitly considered the way
nonlegal scholars teach American constitutionalism, Professor
Amar might have recognized that better integration of the subject matter of constitutional law will still leave
constitutionalism studied piecemeal by discipline. His effort to
improve understandings of the Constitution as a whole requires
radical reform of the academy rather than minor revisions in
first year constitutional law courses. Had The Bill of Rights
examined the Constitution from the perspective of persons responsible for designing and maintaining constitutional orders, a
perspective more common in political science than in law, Professor Amar might have considered questions about actual institutional capacity to protect fundamental liberties to be as important as the precise liberties to be protected. This perspective
might foster more awareness of the constitutional failings of the
Fourteenth Amendment and greater attention to the politicians
and justices responsible for the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights during the 1950s and 1960s.
None of these observations undermine the substantive conclusions Professor Amar reaches. The Bill of Rights is a wonderful
history and a sophisticated doctrinal analysis. Professor Amar
can no more be expected to explore all the constitutional con-

5. One manifestation of the artificial boundaries between law and political science is that citations in law reviews are not counted'in political science reputational
surveys, while citations in political science journals are not counted in the analogous
legal surveys.
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cerns liberty raises than any other scholar.6 If there is a weakness in The Bill of Rights, that weakness may be a tendency to
use language in ways that limit constitutional investigation to
doctrinal analysis.7 The problem is less the failure to address
certain issues than rhetorical practices that fail to acknowledge
those important questions concerning the nationalization of civil
liberties that are not questions of constitutional law.
This essay is written from my perspective as a political scientist, but I make no claim to represent political scientists in
general, and not just for the obvious reason that I have no
authority to speak for everyone with a Doctor of Philosophy in
political science or even for all the dues paying members of the
Law and Courts section of the American Political Science Association. At best, the claims made in this paper reflect the concerns of those political scientists who are returning to that
discipline's historic concerns with constitutional analysis. Law
professors who claim that political scientists slight legal considerations when constructing attitudinal or strategic models of
judicial decision making will get no quarrel from me.' The
present forum, however, is far better suited for discussing how
law professors might benefit from some political science perspectives than for detailing how political scientists would benefit from taking law more seriously.
I. TEACHING CONSTITUTIONALISM
From the beginning, quite literally, The Bill of Rights identifies constitutional scholarship with legal scholarship. The first

6. He also cannot be expected to read or cite every work in any discipline that
might be relevant to his subject.
7. I should emphasize from the start that I do not know Professor Amar personally and do not have any mind reading capacities. For all I know, he may be extremely well read in the political science literature. My comments are simply that
The Bill of Rights could have been improved by greater acknowledgment of certain
constitutional issues that political scientists tend to think about. I have no idea the
degree to which Professor Amar thinks about these matters.
8. For the leading examples of this strand of public law scholarship in political
science, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998), and
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL

MODEL (1993). I briefly criticize the failure of these and similar works to immerse
themselves in legal writing in Mark A. Graber, Historical Institutionalism as/and
Scholarship, 9 L. AND CTS. NEWSL. 14 (forthcoming 1999).
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paragraph proclaims, "[i]nstead of being studied holistically, the
Bill [of Rights] has been broken up into discrete blocks of text,
with each segment examined in isolation."9 The evidence for
this assertion about how "we" study the Constitution is confined
to an analysis of how law professors study the Constitution.
Professor Amar criticizes the "typical law school curriculum" for
dividing responsibility for teaching various constitutional provisions between numerous courses, and "legal scholarship," where
again "[e]ach clause is typically considered separately."0 "[N]o
legal academic in the twentieth century," he concludes, "has
attempted to write in a truly comprehensive way about the Bill
of Rights as a whole.""
No mention is made in the introduction of how the Constitution is studied in other disciplines, or even if the American
Constitution is a basic unit of study in other disciplines. The
last pages of The Bill of Rights do assert that "this is a law
book (written about law by a law professor)." 2 Perhaps the
pronoun "we" in the introduction refers only to law professors
and other members of the legal community. Still, The Bill of
Rights is being marketed to a general audience 3 and is written in remarkably accessible prose.'4 Until the very end of the
work, readers have every reason to think Professor Amar is
criticizing a general failure of American constitutional scholarship rather than a distinctive limitation of American legal
scholarship. If some other discipline is teaching and studying
the Constitution properly, surely examples of this better practice should be pointed out. Moreover, even if the intended audience for this book is far more narrow than initial appearances
and merit suggest, a more explicit recognition of how disciplines
other than law study American constitutionalism is a necessary

9. AMTAR, supra note 1, at xi.
10. Id.
11. Id. at xi-xii.
12. Id. at 302.
13. See id. at 296 (stating that "this is a book written not just for lawyers and
judges but for ordinary citizens who care about our Constitution and our rights").
Notice that the relevant categories are lawyers and ordinary citizens, which means
that the role of nonlegal scholars is unclear.
14. Among other virtues, The Bill of Rights may be the most well-written book on
American constitutionalism published this decade.
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prerequisite for thinking about the American Constitution as a
whole.
A. Constitutionalism and the Curriculum
Undergraduates at American universities are taught American constitutionalism in ways that seem far more holistic by
Professor Amar's standards than the curriculum at most major
law schools. Most political science departments have a one or
two term course sequence that unsuccessfully attempts to cover
as many constitutional issues as possible. Article II issues are
not farmed out to the course on the presidency, and constitutional criminal procedure is not left to the department of criminal justice. What I do not teach in my constitutional law
courses probably does not get taught to political science majors
and graduate students at the University of Maryland. Many
political scientists and, I suspect, most historians, teach constitutional law chronologically rather than by subject. This approach fosters appreciation of potential connections between
different constitutional provisions that the law school approach
may obscure. Undergraduates may quickly perceive relationships between Brown v. Board of Education,5 Miranda v. Arizona, 6 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'7 when these cases are taught by the same instructor, in the same course, and,
often, in the same week.18
Nevertheless, the undergraduate curriculum on closer inspection is no more holistic than the law school curriculum (and not
just because many college professors use law school casebooks
when teaching constitutional law). American constitutionalism
at the undergraduate level is broken up by discipline rather
than by subject matter. The history department offers a course
in American constitutional history, the philosophy department
offers a course in constitutional theory, and the political science
department offers a course in constitutional politics. One result

15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. For some of the relationships between these cases, see HARRY KALVEN, JR.,
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965), and Louis Michael Seidman, Brown
and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).

1999]

CONSTITUTION AS A WHOLE

349

is less attention to the sort of doctrinal issues that are typically
covered in loving detail by law professors. Another consequence
'is a good deal of repetition, particularly if the political scientist
teaching constitutional law is philosophically or historically
minded. 9 A third consequence is the tendency not to foster
thinking in any systematic way about the relationships between
constitutional history, philosophy, and politics. Philosophy students may never explore how the political environment of the
1970s influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade.20 Some political science students may never consider the
independent influence of legal ideas on judicial decisions.2 1
The partial perspectives all disciplines offer on American
constitutionalism suggest that any course of study not centered
on American constitutionalism or on constitutionalism in general will treat much material in isolation that is better studied as
a whole.2 2 This problem is far broader than the tendency in
law schools for free speech and criminal procedure to be taught
in different classes. The organization of the academy, rather
than any distinctive failing of legal pedagogy, is the single
greatest obstacle to truly comprehensive understandings of
American constitutionalism. Some students learn American
constitutionalism almost exclusively from experts on constitutional law, others learn American constitutionalism almost
exclusively from experts on constitutional history, and so on. If
the legal curriculum seems particularly piecemeal, the cause
may be the greater isolation of law schools from other academic
disciplines.
Institutional problems generally require institutional solutions. Professor Amar's admirable effort to read the Constitution as a whole is, at best, partial compensation for the costs
that relative academic isolation impose on constitutional studies. His constitutional law courses are likely organized in ways
19. I plead guilty as charged.
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. This, I believe, is the fundamental weakness of a leading textbook on constitutional law in political science. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS
(3d ed. 1998).
22. Both the law school and undergraduate curriculum are clearly guilty of isolating the study of American constitutionalism from the study of alternative constitution-

al forms.
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that make students aware of the interconnections between the
liberties set out in the Bill of Rights, but are probably not organized in ways that foster questions about the sort of political
culture necessary to maintain the constitutional regime The Bill
of Rights admires. My courses do better on issues of constitutional culture and worse on questions of constitutional doctrine.
Political scientists, law professors, and other scholars who teach
the Constitution will never be able to cram all of constitutionalism into their one or two course sequences. Still, we can
at a minimum teach and write in ways that acknowledge that
our courses do not offer comprehensive coverage of American
constitutionalism, even if we cover every provision in the
Constitution's text or review the history of the Supreme Court
from 1787 to the present.
More significantly, constitutional scholars in all disciplines
should strive to break down the artificial barriers between
academic disciplines, particularly the barriers between law
schools and graduate departments. What, after all, justifies the
often near total separation of the law school from other academic disciplines that regard law or constitutionalism as a
basic unit of study? Given Professor Amar's interdisciplinary
focus and interest in addressing citizens, should he not be
teaching undergraduates and graduate students, as well as
future legal practitioners? Indeed, I suspect that his writings,
and those of such scholars as Bruce Ackerman' and Sandy
Levinson,24 will be of far more professional use to my Doctor
of Philosophy students, almost all of whom will become professors, than to Yale law students, almost all of whom will become
lawyers.25 These observations suggest that fostering more comprehensive thinking about American constitutionalism will in
the long run require structural reorganization of the university,
not simply
some rethinking of the traditional constitutional law
26
course.

23. See 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE
A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
24. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995).
25. I also suspect that Professor Amar and I have more intellectual interests in
common than I do with most political scientists who teach quantitative methods and
than he does with most law professors who teach federal taxation.
26. Why American constitutionalism or constitutionalism in general ought to be a
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B. Constitutionalism in Scholarship
Constitutional scholarship outside the legal academy also
seems more holistic than most legal scholarship. Historians can
defend themselves, though I am curious whether Jack Rakove's
Original Meanings" offers a comprehensive understanding of
the Constitution of 1787. Within political science, Wayne
Moore's Constitutional Rights and Powers of the People'e represents a distinguished recent effort that is "writ[ten] in any
comprehensive way about the Bill of Rights as a whole" and
"consider[s] the rich interplay between the original Constitution
and the Bill of Rights."' Members of the Princeton school of
constitutional thought write extensively about the need for
constitutional interpreters to consider the entire Constitution
rather than particular provisions one at a time. Walter Murphy,
in particular, insists on the importance of ordering and coordinating various constitutional values. 0 Steve Elkin and Karol
Soltan have edited several collections of essays concerned with
constitutionalism from the perspective of the persons responsible for designing and maintaining constitutional orders.3 ' Rog-

central organizing theme in law school or in the undergraduate curriculum is not
clear. Organizing such a course of study, after all, will require treating other material
in isolation that is better examined as a whole. Students who are better placed to
realize the connections between Brown and Miranda may be poorly placed to appreciate the connections between the statutory and constitutional law of confessions. Philosophers may decide that treating constitutional issues as a species of moral problems may be more important than ensuring that students know the social context of
particular Supreme Court decisions. At any rate, this suggests that the curriculum
changes Professor Amar might want are more far ranging and impose more costs
than a quick perusal of The Bill of Rights suggests.
27. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1996).

28. WAYNE D. MOORE,

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE

(1996). Readers should decide for themselves whether Princeton, Harvard, Yale, Chicago, California, and the other university presses are sufficiently undistinguished that
law professors cannot reasonably be expected to be familiar with the constitutional
scholarship by non-lawyers that these presses publish.
29. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1132 (1991).
30. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 703 (1980). The most influential work in the Princeton tradition is SOTIRIOS A.
BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984).
31. See A NEw CONSTITUTIONALISM: DESIGNING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR A
GOOD SOCIETY (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1993); KAROL EDWARD
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ers Smith has detailed the ways in which changing understandings of liberalism have influenced the interpretation of numerous constitutional provisions,32 and has recently written on
how different comprehensive approaches to the Constitution inspired different models of citizenship."3 Howard Gillman is documenting how numerous constitutional provisions were originally understood as means for preventing class legislation.'
My first book highlighted the broader jurisprudential and philosophical groundings for free speech arguments, the economic
policies and political institutions thought necessary to protect
free speech, and the other constitutional understandings Americans have thought a commitment to free speech entailed.'
One occasionally finds political scientists writing doctrinal
exegesis of particular constitutional provisions or problems, but
such works have had less influence than more broader
concerns.
The difference between the dominant lines of constitutional
scholarship in the legal academy and in political science departments may partly reflect the different pedagogical purposes of
law schools and undergraduate institutions. Law schools primarily train practicing lawyers. Professor Amar and I may
mourn this fact, but the traditional, narrowly focused, law review discussion of a discrete area of law may be of more immediate use to a legal practitioner than the mode of legal analysis
found in The Bill of Rights or in the constitutional scholarship
most political scientists produce.36 Political science depart-

SOLTAN & STEPHEN L. ELTIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF GOOD SOCIETIES (1996). Professors Elkin and Soltan also edit a journal, The Good Society, dedicated to issues of
constitutional design.
32. See

ROGERS

M. SMITH,

LIBERALISM

AND

AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

(1985).
33. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIC IDEALS: C6NFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN

U.S. HISTORY (1997).
34. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); Howard Gillman, Preferred

Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil
Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623 (1994); Howard Gillman, The Collapse of
Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in
the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 191 (1997).
35. See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY
OF CIVL LIBERTARIANISM (1991).

36. This is my best guess. Legal practitioners and judges are obviously the best
authorities on what sort of scholarship they find most useful.
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ments train undergraduates to be good citizens and graduate
students to be good political scientists. Playing law professor in
a political science classroom is frowned upon, and the chances
of placing a traditional doctrinal argument in a refereed political science journal are slim. Thus, the environment in political
science departments is far more conducive to producing works
as ambitious as The Bill of Rights than another commentary on
whether Roe v. Wade37 was correctly decided. Professor Amar's
emphasis on how different his work seems from many of his
peers in law school leads him to discount (or at least not acknowledge) the similarities between his work and those of nonlegal constitutional scholars (in disciplines other than history).
The Bill of Rights is a strikingly original work, but not quite
for some of the reasons suggested in the book's introduction.
Many scholars treat the Constitution as a whole. Indeed, most
law professors who write on constitutional theory treat the
Constitution as a whole. Ronald Dworkin,' Cass Sunstein,39
and Sandy Levinson' all offer comprehensive visions of constitutional life, even though the first two in particular spend
much time applying those visions to particular constitutional
problems. Professor Amar is extraordinarily skilled at detailing
how particular constitutional provisions should be interpreted in
light of the language used in related constitutional provisions
and the more general principles underlying the inclusion of that
language in the Constitution. This form of constitutional argument, which he labels "intratextualism,"41 is indeed a distinct,
important, and enlightening approach to constitutionalism. Still,
as Professor Amar acknowledges elsewhere, intratextualism is
not unique in treating the Constitution as a whole. Structural
arguments also "seek[] to identify and draw meaning from larger constitutional patterns."42 Moreover, both intratextualism
and structuralism retain the traditional doctrinal focus of legal

37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE MiERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
39. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).

40. See sources cited supra note 24.
41. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 296; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv.
L. REv. 747 (1999) [hereinafter Amnar, Intratextualism].

42. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 41, at 790.
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writing. Most political scientists do not focus on such questions

as, How should the First Amendment be interpreted? Constitutional scholarship in my discipline tends to focus on such questions as, (1) What are the essential features and vital struggles
within a particular constitutional regime? (2) How are constitutional orders created, maintained and destroyed? and (3) How
can institutions be designed to ensure wise government actions
and the protection of fundamental rights? Mere recognition of
these questions would not require Professor Amar to practice
political science without a license; such scholarship tends to be
of low quality." Still, had The Bill of Rights been better
grounded in political science scholarship, the book might have
at least acknowledged several vital questions concerning incorporation that are not questions of constitutional law. This
awareness would not require any alteration in Professor Amar's
understanding of what the Constitution means, but might have
influenced his thinking on the constitutional issues associated
with how those meanings have and have not been realized in
practice.
II. DESIGNING CONSTITUTIONS
The second part of The Bill of Rights begins by asserting "we
must tackle questions like these:"'
What is the relation between the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment? Does the amendment "incorporate"
the Bill, making the Bill's restrictions on federal power
applicable against states? If so, which words in the Fourteenth Amendment work this change? Are all, or only some,
of the provisions of the first ten amendments incorporated
or absorbed into the Fourteenth? If only some, which ones,
and why? Once incorporated or absorbed, does a right or
freedom declared in the Bill necessarily constrain state and
federal governments absolutely equally in every jot and tittle?45

43. See Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly
Neglected Relationship, in 16 CONST. COMMENTARY (forthcoming 1999).
44. AMAR, supra note 1, at 137.
45. Id.
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Professor Amar offers a series of fascinating answers to these
questions. He claims that the persons responsible for the postCivil War Constitution understood the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting state
action that violated the individual rights provisions set out in
the Bill of Rights. Moreover, he insists that those individual
rights provisions are best interpreted as they were understood
in 1868, not how they were understood in 1791 when the Bill of
Rights was ratified. His argument persuasively demonstrates
that these were fundamental goals of many northern antislavery activists and that the language they used when drafting
and defending the Fourteenth Amendment strongly supports
the position The Bill of Rights describes as "refined incorporation."
I am convinced, or as convinced as I need to be for purposes
of constitutional practice. The constitutional historian in me
wants to do more research with primary sources and learn
what professional historians have to say about The Bill of
Rights before proclaiming to the world that "refined incorporation," or some close cousin, is the absolute best interpretation of
the original understanding of the relationship between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. Still, for the
purposes of constitutional interpretation, all that should be
demanded is a highly plausible reading, a standard The Bill of
Rights clearly meets.
Very few justices, lawyers, politicians, or citizens have the
time or capacity to do the serious historical research necessary
to determine whether Professor Amar has produced the absolute best analysis of the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The most one can reasonably expect is that constitutional authorities will be aware of the range of readings that
most historians regard as competent. 47 Moreover, historical
understandings change over time. Professor Amar notes that
the dominant understandings of both the Framing and Reconstruction have changed dramatically during the last fifty years

46. See generally id. at 137-283.
47. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565,
1575 (1997). See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLuIJ. L. REv. 523 (1995).
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and that "an immense amount of work on Reconstruction remains to be done."' The high probability that scholarship in
the near future will again revise the dominant Reconstruction
story suggests that insisting constitutional understandings be
based on the best historical understandings of a given time will
undermine the degree of stability that both constitutionalism
and originalism promise.49
For numerous reasons, the powers of the federal government
and rights of American citizens should not be a strict function
of what some historian finds in the attic of the Madison or
Bingham estates. Constitutions, Steven Holmes and Phil
Bobbitt suggest, function best by constraining political choice. 0
Both the constraint and the choice elements are necessary ingredients of a sound constitutional regime. A constitution that
did not constrain politics would result in chaos; a constitution
that provided too much constraint would impose a dictatorship
of the past. Professor Amar has clearly given refined incorporation the textual and historical pedigree necessary to belong to
the choice set of legitimate constitutional alternatives. Still,
when choosing between refined incorporation and other highly
plausible constitutional readings, Americans should consider
which will result in the most just society. Such investigations
require recourse to both normative theory, for determining the
nature of just societies, and social science, for determining the
most likely consequences of adopting a particular constitutional
51
policy.

48. AMAR, supra note 1, at 302-04.
49. Professor Amar recognizes this point when he asserts "precedent counts, too."
Id. at 307.
50. See PHILIP BOBBriT,

CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION

118 (1991);

Stephen

Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
51. Professor Amar briefly recognizes the need to supplement intratextualism with
other constitutional logics, and makes a good case that refined incorporation has
made the United States a more just society. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 289-90, 299.
His writings on constitutional procedure would benefit from more empirical understandings of the constitutional vices and virtues of actual policies in practice, but I
have made that argument elsewhere. See Mark A. Graber, Book Review, 7 LAW &
POL'Y BOOK REV. 431, $ 5 (Sept. 1997) <http://www.unt.edu:80/lpbr/subpages/reviews/
amar.htm> (reviewing AKIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCE-

DURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)).
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For present purposes, I am more interested in Professor
Amar's questions than his answers. His introduction proclaims,
awe must tackle questions" concerning the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights not simply because those questions are central to
the themes of the Bill of Rights, but because they "go[] to the
very nature of our Constitution' with 'profound effects for all of
us.,,52 w[I]t is difficult,"' Professor Amar and Professor William
Van Alstyne agree, "'to imagine a more consequential subject."'5 3 This "assessment," the paragraph continues, is "confirmed by the extraordinary number of twentieth-century legal
giants who have locked horns in the [incorporation] debate."'
Professor Amar again bases a general claim about the Constitution entirely on what law professors and the Supreme Court
have said about our constitutional regime. The introductory
paragraphs to Part II move from claiming that the incorporation debate "go[es] to the very nature of our Constitution" to
discussing "the centrality of the incorporation debate to twentieth-century constitutional law" without betraying any awareness that some questions that "go[] to the very nature of our
Constitution" might not be questions of constitutional law.'
The "legal giants" who testify to the significance of the incorporation debate are all academic lawyers or federal justices. 6
Whether non-lawyers who have studied the Constitution or
officials in the legislative and executive branches of government
attach the same significance to the relationship between the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment is not mentioned.
Questioning the precise significance of incorporation is, of
course, nitpicking of the worst sort. No one thinks unimportant
the issues raised in Part II of The Bill of Rights. Professor
Amar's claim that a particular series of questions is important,
even extremely important, to American constitutionalism does
not in any way deny that another series of questions may be as
"profound" or "consequential." Still, scholarly interest in the
incorporation debate varies by discipline and time. The giants
of constitutional studies outside the legal profession have dis-

52. AMAR, supra note 1, at 137 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 137-38 (first alteration in original).
56. See id. at 138.
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played less interest in incorporation than law professors and
justices. Moreover, this generation of legal scholars seems less
interested in that issue than their immediate predecessors.
Thinking more self-consciously about the reasons for this difference may help identify other important questions of constitutional politics that persons sharing Professor Amar's concern
about protecting fundamental rights ignore at their peril.
A. The Doctrinal Significance of Incorporation
Even law professors may doubt whether, in 1999, questions
concerning the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment remain central concerns of American
constitutionalism. The legal writings and cases Professor Amar
cites as demonstrating the importance of the incorporation
debate are more than twenty years old. From the perspective of
both constitutional law and constitutional politics, the most
important incorporation questions are well settled, except possibly the incorporation of the Second Amendment." The Supreme Court has ruled that states are obligated to honor virtually all of the individual liberties set out in the Bill of
Rights.5" No Supreme Court justice, prominent judicial wannabe, academic superstar, or high ranking government official outside of Alabama is presently challenging this consensus.59
Even Robert Bork thinks that the Supreme Court should adhere to existing precedent.'
The Bill of Rights does not challenge this dominant consensus. Professor Amar admits that contemporary doctrine is fairly

57. See Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an "Underenforced Constitutional Norm," 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoLlY, 719, 752-61 (1998); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REv. 1
(1996); David E. Murley, Private Enforcement of the Social Contract: DeShaney and
the Second Amendment Right to Own Firearms, 36 DUQ. L. REv. 15, 32-48 (1997);
Michael J. Quinlan, Is There a Neutral Justification for Refusing to Implement the
Second Amendment or is the Supreme Court Just "Gun Shy," 22 CAP. U.L. REV. 641
(1993).
58. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 138-39, 306-07 (citing the relevant cases).
59. For a discussion of various challenges to incorporation by elected officials and
justices in Alabama, see Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A
Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1998).
60. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 94 (1991).
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consistent with refined incorporation. His "tale

. .

. ends up

supporting most of today's precedent about the Bill of
Rights."6' What the book does is "explain how today's judges
and lawyers have often gotten it right without quite realizing
why." 2 Accomplishing this goal is a worthwhile endeavor, but
hardly one that has "profound effects for all of us."' Scholarship which provided a more coherent constitutional justification
of the Louisiana Purchase would be a welcomed project. Still,
while a judicial decision or executive decree that the United
States at present cannot exercise sovereignty west of the Mississippi would really have "profound effects for all of us," such
rulings are unlikely to be forthcoming even if the entire Yale
Law faculty reaches the conclusion that in 1803 President Jefferson acted with any color of constitutional authority."
Traditional doctrinal analysis directed at courts normally
highlights those issues presently under serious judicial consideration. Professor Amar, to his credit, is at least as interested in
addressing fellow citizens as he is nine justices." Still, if the
central focus of The Bill of Rights is on how the Constitution
should be interpreted, the work might have considered at more
length those questions presently dividing the body politic, rather than such relatively settled issues as incorporation (or the
Louisiana Purchase). The most important questions of constitutional law in 1999 have more to do with government structure
and power than the rights protected by the Constitution
(though Professor Amar is right to note that no sharp distinction exists among the two).' The questions include:

61. AMAR, supra note 1, at 307.
62. Id. Professor Amar does object to the ways in which the Supreme Court has
been interpreting particular liberties set out in the Bill of Rights, but his arguments
against these objectionable precedents do not depend for the most part on the argument in The Bill of Rights. See id. at 307 n.* (acknowledging that his "critique" of
"modem judicial doctrine" on constitutional criminal procedure is "tangential to the
main issues of Creation-Reconstruction synthesis at the core of [this] book").
63. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
CAL. L. REv. 929, 934 (1965).
64. For Jefferson's constitutional scruples, see Gerhard Casper, Executive-Congressional Separation of Power During the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 473, 490-97 (1995).
65. This decision no doubt pleased the marketing department of Yale University
Press.
66. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 127-29.
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Did the framers intend to limit government power to a few
specified functions? Was the New Deal implicit in the constitution of 1787 or in the constitution of 1868? If not, are
the Supreme Court's decisions sustaining the New Deal
justified either by the constitutional moment in 1937 or by
the nature of a living constitution?'
Professor Amar briefly mentions these issues, but citizens interested in fuller discussion will have to turn from The Bill of
Rights to the writings of Bruce Ackerman and Howard
Gillman.'
B. The ConstitutionalSignificance of Incorporation
Professor Amar's concern with the incorporation debate is
better understood as exhibiting a broader constitutional perspective than the average law review essay, not simply in the
sense of recognizing the interconnections between various constitutional provisions, but in recognizing that constitutional
questions may be fundamental even when such issues are not
presently being litigated in the federal courts. Fundamental
constitutional questions define a particular political regime. The
question whether the United States should adopt a presidential
or parliamentary system of governance goes to the heart of our
constitutional order, even though our commitment to a presidential system seems relatively enduring. Incorporation is similarly vital to our constitutional order. The issues associated
with the nationalization of fundamental rights are of profound
significance for all citizens. Educated citizens cannot make
intelligent political choices unless they understand the reasons
why the persons responsible for the Constitution of 1787 chose
a presidential system and the reasons why the persons responsible for the Constitution of 1868 chose something like refined
incorporation, even if these constitutional practices are not
likely to change in the foreseeable future.
Still, and this is the place this essay stops nitpicking, Professor Amar's important questions are incomplete. He asks tradi-

67. See id.
68. See sources cited supra notes 23, 34.
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tional legal questions about the meaning of a constitutional
text. The more fundamental questions, from a political science
perspective, concern the relationships between constitutional
language and constitutional practice, and how a text is expected
to structure and has structured political life. The question at
the heart of a liberal democratic constitutional order is, How
(and how well) does this constitution protect fundamental
rights? The question is not simply, What rights does this constitution protect? The first question incorporates the second. We
cannot evaluate how well a constitution protects fundamental
rights until we know what rights that constitution was designed to protect. Still, the questions of constitutional law do
not exhaust constitutional analysis. Constitutionalists must
identify and assess those constitutional mechanisms responsible
for realizing constitutional rights. Placing a right in the text of
the constitution does not necessarily increase the probability
the right will be protected.
The Bill of Rights is alert to some of the interplay between
constitutional liberty and constitutional structure. Part I very
effectively demonstrates that the original Bill of Rights is better
understood as establishing institutions and practices by which
persons could protect their fundamental rights than as a simple
declaration of individual rights. "[Tihe Bill of Rights," Professor
Amar brilliantly demonstrates, "can itself be seen as a Constitution of sorts-that is, as a document attentive to structure,
focused on the agency problem of government, and rooted in the
sovereignty of We the People of the United States."6 9 Still, the
text might have elaborated a bit more on what Hamilton meant
when, in The FederalistPapers, he declared that the Constitution was "itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful
purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.""0 More significantly, Professor
Amar, when discussing the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
explain why the Framers of 1868 thought the reconstructed
Constitution would better protect individual rights than the
Constitution of 1787. The result is a celebration of the second
most significant constitutional failure in American history.71

69. AMAR, supra note 1, at 127.

70. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
71. The greatest failure was the inability of constitutional institutions to prevent
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1. Protecting Rights: The Creation
Virtually all of the debates during the conventions that drafted and ratified the Constitution of 1787 were devoted to the
structure of the national government. Even questions concerning government policy and power tended to be discussed in
terms of how to structure government institutions. The most
vigorous defenses of slavery, for example, were articulated during debates over how to allocate representation in Congress.
Many southerners were quite willing to give the national government broadly defined powers if the government was structured in ways that would ensure control by representatives
from slaveholding states. Pierce Butler of South Carolina even
declared himself in favor of "abolishing the State Legislatures"
should representation "proceed[] on a principle favorable to
wealth as well as numbers of Free Inhabitants," a principle all
thought would favor the South. 2
The participants in the slavery debate recognized, as Professor Amar does, that debates over the structure of government
implicate the protection of fimdamental rights. The persons
responsible for the Constitution of 1787 were not unconcerned
with individual liberties. Rather, they maintained that such
freedoms were best protected by well-designed political institutions rather than by parchment declarations. "[AIIll observations
founded upon the danger of usurpation," Hamilton declared in
The FederalistPapers, "ought to be referred to the composition
and structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of
its powers."" Madison insisted that religious freedom was better protected by an electoral system that prevented any religious sect from dominating government than by any textual assertion of religious freedom. 4

the Civil War.
72. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 144 (Max Farrand
ed., Yale Univ. Press 1966). I detail this argument at length in MARK A- GRABER,
DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITuTIONAL EVIL (forthcoming 2001).
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 84 supra note 70, at 515. This theme will be
developed at length in GRABER, supra note 72.
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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The persons responsible for the original Constitution may
have been wrong to oppose a Bill of Rights. Placing a specific
set of rights or limitations on government power in the written
text of a constitution may be a vital means for ensuring that
government in practice respects those rights and limitations.75
Such textual declarations may increase public awareness of and
commitment to those rights, or justify an institutional obligation to protect those rights.' Still, questions concerning what
liberties ought to be placed in a constitutional text should be
considered in light of how to design a constitution that will
protect liberty, and not simply as a matter of what liberties a
constitution ought to protect.
The main Federalist objection to a Bill of Rights suggests
that differences between proponents and opponents of the Constitution on this issue were primarily over constitutional design
rather than constitutional power or constitutional right. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, James Wilson, Roger Sherman,
and most of their political allies rarely raised substantive objections to the content of the liberties set out in the first ten
amendments to the Constitution." The Federalist Papers, The
Federalist No. 84 in particular, insisted that such fundamental
liberties as the freedom of speech would be protected even if
not explicitly mentioned in the text. The Federalist objections to
the Bill of Rights went to redundancy and the problem of defining rights, not substance. '8 Reading the Constitution as a
whole, therefore, suggests that the first ten amendments are
best understood as a means for increasing the probability that
the national government will respect certain rights, and not as
additional limitations on federal power.

75. Though nowhere in The Bill of Rights is there an argument that what protection Americans have provided for freedoms is more the result of the Bill of Rights
than the structure of government (or, from a different perspective, the sociology of

the country).
76. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 129-32.
77. Differences did surface over the interpretation of those liberties.
78. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 70, at 514.
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2. Protecting Rights: Reconstruction
Had The Bill of Rights been written from the perspective of a
constitutional designer, Professor Amar might have begun Part
II by asking the political question, What were the persons responsible for the post-Civil War Constitution trying to do when
they drafted the Fourteenth Amendment? in addition to the
legal question, What did the persons responsible for the postCivil War Constitution mean by the language used in the Fourteenth Amendment? This political question, as discussed above,
incorporates the legal question. We cannot understand what
John Bingham and others were trying to accomplish when they
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment unless we know what they
meant by the text they choose. Still, greater emphasis on how
the Framers of the post-Civil War Constitution thought they
were bringing about major political changes highlights some
features of Reconstruction civil rights law and politics that get
slighted in The Bill of Rights.
The constitutional design perspective identifies an apparent
paradox in northern constitutional thought. Professor Amar
documents that a strong strand of antebellum northern thought
believed Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore79 to be mistaken, that
the Constitution of 1787/1791 already obligated states to protect
certain liberties set out in the Bill of Rights.' Barron was
hardly the only or even the most important decision Republicans believed the Supreme Court got wrong. Antislavery advocates were uniformly enraged by the Taney Court's decisions in
Prigg v. Pennsylvania8 ' and Dred Scott v. Sandford.8 The latter decision, in particular, was understood as a gross usurpation and not a simple misreading of the Constitution. Republicans firmly believed that any sincere constitutional interpreter
would have concluded that constitutional history and the constitutional text plainly demonstrated that Congress had at least
the power, if not the obligation, to regulate slavery in the territories. Thus, while the antebellum experience demonstrated the

79.
80.
81.
82.

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
See AMAR, supra note 1, at 145-62.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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need for national protection of fundamental rights, that experience also demonstrated that parchment barriers, even clear
parchment barriers, did not necessarily constrain either constitutional politics or constitutional law. Given that northern Republicans believed that antebellum problems were caused in
large part by failures to adhere to constitutional text, why
would they have attempted to solve their problems by adding
more text? The antebellum Constitution explicitly vested Congress with "[plower to ... make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the territory... belonging to the United
States."' If Jacksonians on the Supreme Court and in the
White House nevertheless insisted that such language did not
authorize Congress to ban slavery north of the Missouri Compromise line, surely their democratic party successors were
capable of ruling that, appearances to the contrary, the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not incorporate the individual
liberties set out in the Bill of Rights.
This paradox can be resolved by considering the interplay of
structure and individual rights that Professor Amar documents
so well in his discussion of the original Bill of Rights. The Bill
of Rights correctly notes that the central concerns of the Framers of 1868 were structural, that Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment were expected to "profoundly shape the
configuration of political power in America,"' and that "many
informed men simply were not thinking carefully about the
words of section I at all. " ' Remarkably, although Professor
Amar points to numerous interconnections between Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment and various provisions of the original Constitution, he makes very little effort to read Section 1 in
light of the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment. Those relationships provide the key to reading the post-Civil War Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment, read as a whole, demonstrates
that the Civil War amendments were as concerned with the
relationships between government structure and individual

83. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
84. AMAR, supra note 1, at 203. I would add that Section 4, by impoverishing the
slaveholding minority, was expected to have a similar effect.
85. rd. at 202
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rights as the original Bill of Rights. Republicans objected to
various individual rights violations in the South, but the central
organizing theme of that antislavery coalition was majoritarianism.' Antislavery attacks on an anti-Republican slave
power and slave policies, scholars agree, "formed the core of the
Republican appeal to northern voters."8" Republican
newspapers consistently asserted that slavery policies violated
republican principles by allowing minority rule. "If our Government, for the sake of Slavery, is to be perpetually the representative of a minority," one journal declared, "it may continue
republican in form, but the substance of its republicanism has
departed."' William Seward declared that the central issue of
the day was "whether a slaveholding class exclusively shall
govern America." 9 Significantly, Republicans believed that violations of individual rights in the South were a consequence of
minority domination, and not an instance of majority tyranny.
The main difference between the northern Republicans of the
Civil War era and Anti-Federalists of the 1780s was the difference between a commitment to national or local
majoritarianism as the best means for protecting fundamental
rights.
Every provision of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed
to ensure that the Slave Power was permanently destroyed.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 simultaneously promote individual freedom
and democratic majoritarianism by establishing a set of economic and political rules thought to guarantee that the Slave Power
would never be able to dominate the national government. Sections I and 5 simultaneously promote individual freedom and
democratic majoritarianism by giving national majorities the
power to protect citizens in those localities where descendants
of the Slave Power continue to rule. The result was not greater

86. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970).
87. William E. Gienapp, The Republican Party and the Slave Power, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF KENNETH M.
STAMPP 51, 57 (Robert H. Abzug & Stephen E. Maizlish eds., 1986); see id. at 53-54;
Larry Gara, Slavery and the Slave Power: A Critical Distinction, 15 CIv. WAR HIST.
5, 6, 12 (1969).
88. Gienapp, supra note 87, at 64-65.
89. 4 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD, THE WORKS OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 274 (George
E. Baker ed., Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1884); see id. at 256, 292-93.
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constitutional protection for minorities per se, but rather greater power for national majorities to protect their supporters and
wards in places where they were local minorities.
The main emphasis of the constitutional revolution of 1868
was on who should protect liberty and not on the liberties to be
protected. "The Fourteenth Amendment," William Nelson correctly declares, "was understood less as a legal instrument to
be elaborated in the courts than as a peace treaty to be administered by Congress in order to secure the fruits of the North's
victory in the Civil War." ° This reading of the entire Fourteenth Amendment explains why Republicans did not fear that
Section 1 would be perverted in the near future and did not
concern themselves with the precise details of what was being
protected. Sections 2, 3, and 4 practically guaranteed that Reconstruction Republicans would be responsible for interpreting
that measure. Liberty and majoritarianism were protected because the liberty loving majority would forever determine the
meaning of the liberty protecting Constitution.
Professor Amar places too much emphasis on judicial protection for fundamental rights when he declares that "[a]s the
paradigmatic speaker in need of constitutional protection shifted
from a localist criticizing the central government to a Unionist
defending its Reconstruction policies, carpetbagging federal
judges appointed in Washington became more trustworthy
guardians of First Amendment freedoms than localist juries."9 '
Congress during Reconstruction did dramatically expand the
jurisdiction of federal courts to provide greater protection for
individual rights in the South.9' Moreover, the Fourteenth
Amendment was written in a way to make clear that its provisions could be enforced in the absence of legislation.' Still,

90. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT- FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 110-11 (1988).
91. AAMAR, supra note 1, at 242.
92. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 143
(1968).
93. An early version of the text read as follows:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in
the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
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while federal judges were deemed more trustworthy than
southern juries, Reconstruction Republicans clearly thought the
national Congress more trustworthy than both. As Nelson concludes in his study of the Fourteenth Amendment, "the framing
generation anticipated that Congress rather than the courts
would be the principle enforcer of section one."'
The primary responsibility of federal justices, in the original
Republican scheme, was to enforce federal civil rights acts
passed under the Fourteenth Amendment.' Given the performance of the antebellum judiciary in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore9 and Dred Scott v. Sandford,' the Chase Court's decision in Ex parte Milligan," and the general sense among Republicans that judicial majorities were not enthusiastic about
the course of Reconstruction, good reason exists for thinking
that the persons responsible for the post-Civil War Constitution
did not intend to vest ultimate authority for protecting individual rights in the federal judiciary. Stanley Kutler and others
have demonstrated that the Supreme Court had risen from its
Dred Scott nadir.99 Still, the dominant constitutional theme of
this period was a push towards legislative supremacy. When
faced with the possibility that the federal judiciary might issue
rulings hostile to Reconstruction, Republicans responded by
passing measures stripping the court of the jurisdiction necessary to hear a crucial case."° A tribunal that could not be
trusted to sustain major Reconstruction legislation was not
likely to be the institution entrusted with primary responsibility
for establishing national standards of liberty.
Scholars more concerned with what the persons responsible
for the Fourteenth Amendment were trying to do are likely to
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
94. NELSON, supra note 90, at 122.
95. Here, I should emphasize, I am not claiming that the main purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to provide constitutional foundations for the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, a view which Professor Amar and others effectively discredit. Rather, my

claim is that the main purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide constitutional foundations for any act Congress might think necessary to protect the fundamental rights of persons of color and southern Unionists.
96. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
97. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 453-54 (1857).
98. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130-31 (1867).
99. See KUTLER, supra note 92, at 161-65.
100. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514-15 (1869).
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be more critical than Professor Amar is of the achievements of
the Reconstruction Congress. The Bill of Rights unequivocally
celebrates the constitutional order constructed in 1868. "The
Reconstruction generation," Professor Amar writes, "took a
crumbling and somewhat obscure edifice, placed it on new, high
ground, and remade it so that it truly would stand as a temple
of liberty and justice for all."10 ' In his view, Americans give
"too much credit to James Madison and not enough to John
Bingham" for the liberties we enjoy today. °2 The Bill of
Rights acknowledges that judicial majorities (with very little
political protest) did not immediately interpret the Privileges
and Immunities Clause as protecting the individual rights set
out in the Bill of Rights, but offers very plausible arguments as
to why this history does not refute that work's interpretation of
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment."0 '
At no point does Professor Amar assign any blame to the Reconstruction generation for the dismal state of civil liberties in
the United States from the 1870s until at least the 1950s.
When the constitutional spotlight is on what the Framers -of
1868 were trying to do when they used certain language rather
than simply on what they believed that language meant, the
reconstructed Constitution seems more a failure than a success
story. Whatever the original understanding, state governments
for the next seventy-five years did not regard themselves as
obligated by the Fourteenth Amendment to honor the liberties
set out in the Bill of Rights, and were not encouraged to do so
by the federal government. Until World War II, the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments did almost nothing to improve the
lot of persons of color, political dissenters, religious minorities,
and other persons whose fundamental rights were routinely
violated by state governments. The appropriate architectural
metaphor for the post-Civil War Constitution is less the "temple
of liberty and justice," than Sleeping Beauty's castle, a beautiful
mansion surrounding by thorns and obscured from view.
Reconstruction Republicans are implicated in the failure of
the post-Civil War Amendments for two reasons. First, although

101. AMAR, supra note 1, at 288.
102. Id. at 293.
103. See id. at 206-07, 212-13.
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some persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment fought
hard for civil rights throughout their political careers, many
Republicans lost interest in the fate of persons of color and the
Fourteenth Amendment during the 1870s. John Bingham lived
until 1900, but does not appear to have been too upset or even
interested when the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House
Cases"° ruled that states were still free to decide whether to
protect the liberties set out in the Bill of Rights." 5
Second, and more important from a political science perspective, the framework established by Reconstruction Republicans
for protecting liberty did not work as expected. The Reconstruction generation assumed that constitutional institutions which
prevented a slaveholding minority from dominating the national
government and empowered national (northern-based) majorities
to protect local minorities would ensure that fundamental liberties were protected throughout the United States. The reconstructed Constitution did facilitate northern political power. For
the next hundred years, the President was almost always a
citizen of a state that fought on the Union side during the Civil
War, and the Supreme Court exhibited a decided northern tilt.
Those coalitions, nevertheless, failed to protect liberty for the
next hundred years because national northern majorities lost
interest in protecting liberty. Trusting their rectitude, the Reconstruction generation never considered the constitutional
choices that would have to be made should their cherished
majoritarian and libertarian convictions lead to different results
in practice.
The failure of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect liberty
(or the right liberties) for approximately one hundred years was
a constitutional failure and not, as The Bill of Rights implies, a
mere failure of Americans to follow or correctly interpret constitutional rules. Well designed constitutions lay down rules and
structure institutions in ways that best ensure the rules will be
followed. Indeed, when institutions are well designed, certain
rules need not be explicitly laid down. Spaghetti and meatballs
will be served once a week at the Graber/Frank residence if the

104. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
105. See id. at 78-79; 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 277-78 (Allen Johnson ed., 1929) (providing biography of John Armor Bingham).
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family constitution in practice guarantees that Abigail selects
the menu on Monday night. A mere parchment declaration that
pasta will be served that day may not be effective."°6 Thus,
when evaluating a scheme of constitutional liberty,
constitutionalists must not only consider the rules laid down,
but whether sufficient institutional mechanisms are in place for
protecting those liberties and other freedoms not so specified.
The constitutional revolution of 1868 was unsuccessful because
the institutional mechanisms for realizing national standards of
liberty were insufficient to ensure government adherence to the
rules laid down.
A good case can be made that the Framers of 1868 did the
best they could, that nothing more could have been done in
1868 that would have provided more constitutional liberty in
1908. Perhaps the best a constitutional text can do is provide
popular majorities with the textual tools to enforce fundamental
rights, and unpopular minorities with textual resources that
can be used to appeal to the moral and legal conscience of
popular majorities. When democratic majorities do not want to
protect rights, in this account, even the best designed democratic constitutions fail. Professor Amar and I probably agree that
constitutional politics in practice is far more complex than this
simplistic account. Constitutional texts structure political preferences and provide instrumental tools for realizing preferences.
Still, in asking whether there was any politically feasible step
the Framers of 1868 could have taken to ensure better protection for fundamental rights, we will be moving beyond examination of the rules they laid down and discussing whether better
institutional means exist for ensuring those rules are followed.
We will be asking constitutional questions rather than mere
questions of constitutional law.
3. Protecting Rights: The Present
If standard accounts of the Bill of Rights "attribute too much
of modern constitutionalism to the Founding... and not
enough to the Reconstruction,""°7 then surely The Bill of

106. It was not.
107. AMAR, supra note 1, at 300.
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Rights attributes too much of modern constitutionalism to the
Reconstruction and not enough to the Warren Court. Professor
Amar has very little to say, and even less that is positive to
say, about the processes by which most provisions in the Bill of
Rights were incorporated in practice during the 1950s and
1960s. He describes the Reconstruction generation in heroic
terms. Because of "their mighty labors," The Bill of Rights declares, "our Bill of Rights was reborn.""°8 The Warren Court,
by comparison, is credited only with the bumbling recovery of
John Bingham's handiwork. "Courts today have ended up in
pretty much the right place," Professor Amar concludes, "even if
not always offered the best textual and historical
they have
10 9
reasons."
This claim that the main roots of the present system of constitutional liberty lie in the late 1860s, not the 1950s, is problematic. That an analysis of 1868 provides the best justification
for the present system of constitutional liberty does not entail
that such an analysis, in fact, explains why that regime was
put in place and maintained. The particular choices and language of the Reconstruction generation seem to have had only a
limited influence on the judicial decisions that actually incorporated most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights."0 Justice
Hugo Black aside, the liberal justices on the Warren Court
were not known for their devotion to constitutional text and
history. A fair possibility exists that, had the Fourteenth
Amendment not existed, some members of that tribunal would
have used the Thirteenth Amendment or some other constitutional provision to compel state governments to respect some
fundamental freedoms."'
The Constitution of 1999 does not protect rights in the manner prescribed by the Constitution of 1868. The Reconstruction
generation assumed that Congress would be the institution that

108. Id. at 294.
109. Id. at 307.
110. Most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights were incorporated at a time when
most academics believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights. One possible inference that might be drawn from this is
that those decisions could be narrowed or even overruled during a time when the
best scholarship concludes that the Framers did intend the total or refined incorporation of the liberties set out in the first 10 amendments to the Constitution.
111. See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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established the national standard of liberty. The main (though
not only) role of the Supreme Court was implementing national
legislation passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. At present, the Supreme Court is the institution that
establishes the national standard of liberty. Congress occasionally participates in this endeavor by passing legislation correcting some judicial decision. The main contribution elected officials have made to the nationalization of civil liberties, however, is their willingness to place on the Supreme Court jurists
who support the nationalization of civil liberties, and their
refusal to pass legislation stripping federal courts of the jurisdiction necessary to nationalize civil liberties.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores"2 is a good vehicle for considering the differences between the constitutional order designed by the Reconstruction
generation and the constitutional order established by Chief
Justice Warren. The justices in Boerne declared unconstitutional
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a bill that required
state governments to respect certain free exercise rights that
the Supreme Court had previously ruled were not protected by
the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Anthony
Kennedy's opinion for the Court held that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment vested Congress with the right to remedy and deter constitutional violations,"' but did not vest Congress with the power "to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States.""4
This position seems clearly wrong from the perspective of
1868. Republicans were primarily concerned with empowering
Congress, not the Supreme Court. Nothing in the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment supports the view that Congress could
pass a law forbidding states from banning peaceful advocacy of
racial equality only if the Supreme Court agreed that the constitutional right of free speech was not limited to the rule of no
prior restraint. Boerne makes sense only from the perspective of
the late twentieth century. In our political order, the Supreme
Court, not Congress, routinely defines constitutional rights. Jus-

112. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
113. See id. at 2164.
114. Id.
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tice Kennedy's error, in this view, is less the result in Boerne
than his attributing to the Reconstruction generation the
scheme for protecting liberty that was not put into place until
after the post-Civil War Amendments were ratified." 5
This distinction between the system of 1868 and the system
of the 1950s is particularly important for persons committed to
preserving or modifying the present regime of constitutional
liberty. Inspired by The Bill of Rights, constitutionally minded
citizens who favor the present scheme of constitutional liberty
might ask, What explains the success of the system of 1868? No
answer exists to the question. The system of 1868 was not a
success, so there is nothing to explain. Reproducing the conditions of Reconstruction may, if anything, weaken present
protections for civil liberty. The proper questions are, What
explains the success of the system of the 1950s? and How
might that system be maintained?" 6 These questions focus on
the political and intellectual environments of the late twentieth
century that are actually responsible for present practice.
Close attention to the political and intellectual forces that in
practice sustain the present state of incorporation provides an
additional reason for questioning the celebratory tone of The
Bill of Rights. Total incorporation of the Bill of Rights certainly
seemed like a good idea to liberals when Earl Warren was in
charge. The most profound impact of refined incorporation over
the next fifty years, however, may be to sharply curtail state
environmental laws and campaign finance regulations." 7 This
possibility suggests the need for serious thinking as to whether
incorporation was desirable during the 1950s and 1960s because
the Warren Court was defining the content of fundamental
liberties or because having fundamental liberties defined at the
national level will generally produce better results. Incorporation in 2010, like due process in 1900, may do more to preserve

115. Although the Warren Court was responsible for nationalizing the Bill of
Rights, I believe that the view that the judiciary was the institution most responsible
for defining constitutional rights was first developed during the late nineteenth century. This topic requires much more research.
116. Persons of a different constitutional persuasion will ask, "How might that
system be destroyed or modified?"
117. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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a conservative status quo than protect the rights of historically
disadvantaged minorities.
III. FINAL THOUGHTS FOR A NEW BEGINNING
The above pages have offered a partial political science critique of The Bill of Rights. The critique is partial partly because I am partial to the scholarship political scientists are
doing on American constitutionalism. With such notable exceptions as Sandy Levinson, Bruce Ackerman, Mark Tushnet, Stephen Griffin, and Barry Friedman, much of this work has not
penetrated deeply into the legal academy. For the most part, a
form of imperial scholarship"' exists among law professors of
all races and political persuasions, one that reduces constitutional scholarship to scholarship that appears (or first appeared) in law reviews and constitutionalism to constitutional
law. Constitutionalists who read the political science scholarship are likely to recognize that not all constitutional questions
are questions of constitutional law. Indeed, as I have argued,
the most crucial questions constitutionalism asks are not doctrinal at all, but concern how institutions have been and might
be designed to privilege certain outcomes, most notably the
protection of certain fundamental rights. Sometimes the Fourteenth Amendment has been used to protect a disadvantaged
minority; other times, the protected minority may include the
richest persons in the country. Understanding why an
amendment can produce such different results in different periods is as significant a constitutional endeavor as understanding
how that amendment is best interpreted.
My political science perspective is also partial because no
perspective on American constitutionalism is complete. Political
scientists, as is the case with members of other disciplines, do
some things well and other things not so well. Few if any nonlawyers have the doctrinal sophistication to produce works as
rich as The Bill of Rights. Moreover, nowhere in any of my
writings or in The Bill of Rights is anything intelligent said
about how foreign constitutional experiences should inform

118. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561 (1984).
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American constitutionalism. In short, we need to create a community of constitutional scholars and students that transcends
disciplinary boundaries if we are to begin to appreciate the full
richness of constitutional life.
Finally, my perspective has been partial because, although
this essay has included far more nitpicking than effusive praise,
Professor Amar has clearly written one of the best books on
American constitutionalism published this decade. No one can
claim to be an educated member of the constitutional community who has not read The Bill of Rights. My hope is that academic lawyers who read this essay will take a look at some of
the literature on constitutionalism produced outside the legal
academy. Perhaps one day, a leading law professor will assert
that no one can claim to be an educated member of the constitutional community who has not read On What the Constitution
Means,119 Liberalism and American Constitutional Law,12
The Constitution Besieged, 2 ' Constitutional Rights and Powers
of the People, 2 and other works produced by this generation's
leading political scientists. At a minimum, I hope that when
pursing many of the fascinating lines of inquiry promised at the
end of The Bill of Rights,' Professor Amar does not limit
himself to constitutional law questions concerning the meaning
of the Constitution, but considers questions concerning how the
Constitution was expected to protect various liberties and how
those liberties have actually been protected, if at all. Such an
investigation will increase dialogue between our disciplines, and
more important, help all citizens better understand, assess, and
improve our constitutional order.
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